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Large and sustained differences in economic performance across regions of developing countries 
have long provided motivation for fiscal incentives designed to encourage firm entry in lagging 
areas.  Empirical evidence in support of these policies, however, has been weak at best.  This paper 
undertakes a direct evaluation of the most prominent fiscal incentive policy in Brazil, the Fundos 
Constitucionais de Financiamento (Constitutional Funds).  In doing so, we exploit valuable features 
of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor's RAIS data set to address two important elements of firm 
location decisions that have the potential to bias an assessment of the Funds: (i) firm “family 
structure” (in particular, proximity to headquarters for vertically integrated firms), and (ii) 
unobserved spatial heterogeneity (with the potential to confound the effects of the Funds). We find 
that the pull of firm headquarters is very strong relative to the Constitutional Funds for vertically 
integrated firms, but that, with non-parametric controls for time invariant spatial heterogeneity, the 
Funds provide statistically and economically significant incentives for firms in many of the targeted 
industries.  
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1.  Introduction 
Sub-national disparities in economic performance and living standards are large 
and often sustained in many countries.  Prospects for lagging regions in developing 
counties are of particular concern as these areas are not just characterized by lower relative 
incomes and standards of living, but may in fact be home to significant incidence of 
absolute poverty.  Local populations may be stuck in so-called spatial poverty traps, in 
which poor infrastructure and resource endowments limit access to educational, social, and 
economic opportunities (Jalan and Ravallion 1997).   
In theory, market dynamics in a system with increasing returns to scale will 
generally favor corner solutions with full out-migration except under conditions of limited 
mobility.  Because this condition is so prevalent in reality, many governments have opted 
for interventions to offset some of these market pressures.  This has created the policy 
tension between the market solution of out-migration or labor flows (i.e., “moving people 
to jobs”), and the intervention of promoting capital flows, including fiscal transfers 
designed to support incomes or to subsidize the creation of jobs and the extension of credit 
(i.e., “moving jobs to people”). 
In many countries, decades of spatially explicit interventions have provided little 
evidence that these policies can lead to improved economic performance and welfare 
enhancements in lagging regions.  In addition, it is also difficult to show whether regional 
incentive policies enhance national welfare.  Is it welfare enhancing to move a firm from 
one location to another and then pay for its re-location costs?  Do these policies encourage 
any new entry, or do they simply result in the spatial re-allocation of firms that would have 
entered anyway?  In this paper, we outline a strategy to evaluate the impacts of spatially   3
explicit development programs – using Brazilian data to implement the initial stages of the 
analysis, and plotting a course for continued research. 
 
Regional Disparities in Brazil 
Brazil has a long history of regional disparities. The Brazilian Northeast has 
historically been the poorest region in the country, with regional per capita incomes being 




th percentiles of the Brazilian monthly income distribution 
by state based on 1991 demographic census data.  The highest median per capita household 
income ($79.93 per month in Goias) is nearly four times larger than that of the lowest 
median per capita household income state ($20.49 per month in Maranhao).  Eight states 
report median per capita household incomes of less than $1 per day, seven of which are 
located in the country’s Northeast region.  Of the ten poorest states in the country, eight are 
in the Northeast, and two in the North region (Azzoni et. al, 2002).  These large per capita 
income differences across regions are, moreover, surprisingly stable over very long 
periods.  Per capita income in the Southeast was 2.9 times that of the Northeast in 1939 
and 2.8 times in 1992 (World Bank, 1998). 
Beyond purely economic indicators, social indicators in the Northeast region are 
also considerably worse than the national average. The illiteracy rate is at least three times 
higher than that of São Paulo, the child mortality rate is twice as large as that of the 
Southeast (54.5 per thousand in the Northeast compared to 26.3 per thousand in the 
Southeast), life expectancy four years shorter, and income inequality is much worse 
(Ferreira, 2004).  Inequality, measured by the Theil coefficient is 0.80 for Ceará, Bahia and   4
Pernambuco, in contrast to 0.55 for the state of São Paulo (Ferreira, 2000).  Fifty percent 
of the Northeast population lives in poverty. 
 
Regional Development Policies in Brazil 
Large regional disparities between the Northeast and the rest of the country 
(coupled with a severe drought in 1958) stimulated the Brazilian government to develop 
explicit policies for that region (Baer, 1995).  The strategy was to establish an autonomous 
center of manufacturing expansion by attracting “dynamic” and high-growth industries, 
such as those in metallurgy, machinery, electrical equipment and paper products (World 
Bank, 1987).  Instruments such as fiscal incentives, transfers, and direct expenditures in the 
form of industrial land and infrastructure were widely used to attract economic activity 
(Goldsmith and Wilson, 1991; Markusen, 1994; World Bank, 1987).   
Financial outlays from the central government in Brazil to support spatially explicit 
programs have been estimated to be US $3 to 4 billion per annum in recent years (Ferreira 
2004).  The estimated cost of tax breaks and associated regional development programs 
(excluding the Zona Franca de Manaus) in 2002 was estimated at almost US $900 million 
(Secretaria da Receita Federal, 2003).  Tax credits directed to the Zona Franca de Manaus 
are estimated to be US $1.2 billion in 2003 alone.  Investment incentive programs for the 
North and the Northeast, funded by income tax deductions, averaged more than 600 
million dollars a year between 1995 and 2000, before they were shut down for accusations 
of mismanagement. 
The main objective of our paper is to examine the effect of regional subsidies on 
industrial prospects of lagging regions in Brazil. There have been several reviews of   5
spatially explicit programs in Brazil and also in other countries, with the general 
conclusion that these initiatives have very small effects.  For instance, Ferreira (2004) 
claims that much of the GDP per capita growth in the Northeast (and convergence with the 
South and Southeast) can be attributed to out-migration rather than local employment 
creation, and that welfare gains from these interventions are limited as most of the 
population that benefited from the jobs created came from other parts of Brazil.  He also 
finds that most of the convergence in per capita incomes across Brazilian regions occurred 
over the period 1970-1985, before the initiation of the Constitutional Funds. [Ellery and 
Ferreira (1996)]  Maia Gomes (2002) finds that, while GDP did grow throughout Brazil 
over the period 1960 to the present, it did not grow as fast in the Northeast (the focus of 
most regional policies) as in the rest of the country.  Ferreira (2004) finds similar results 
focusing only on the period 1990-2000 (i.e., the first decade of the Constitutional Fund 
program). 
Each of these papers looks for indirect evidence of regional policies’ impacts on 
economic outcomes (e.g., GDP or GDP growth rates).  The problem with this approach is 
that these outcomes are affected by a multitude of factors besides regional policy (e.g., 
macroeconomic shocks), some of which may influence certain parts of the country more 
than others.  The relevant question is not whether the Northeast grew faster than the rest of 
the country during the Constitutional Fund program, but rather whether it grew faster than 
it would have in the absence of the program.  This is a very difficult question to answer.  In 
this paper, we instead conduct a more direct evaluation of the impact of the Constitutional 
Funds.  In particular, we address a relatively limited question – did the Constitutional 
Funds successfully induce entry by firms into Brazil’s lagging regions?  Answering this   6
question necessarily precedes and motivates further work on measuring the welfare 
impacts of the policy (which we outline in the conclusion).  In addressing this question, we 
account for two features of the firm location problem that have the potential to bias 
estimates if ignored.  First, we non-parametrically account for regional attributes such as 
amenities, infrastructure, local public goods, and natural endowments.  Since regional 
incentives are allocated to compensate for inter-regional differentials in local 
characteristics, it is imperative to adequately account for these factors in examining the 
contribution of these programs.  Otherwise, there is a tendency to systematically understate 
their value.  Second, our empirical analysis makes use of a linked headquarter-branch plant 
panel data set, which allows us to consider the role of intra-firm considerations in the 
location decisions of vertically integrated firms.  If firms tend to locate branch plants in 
close proximity to their headquarters, and if those headquarters are disproportionately 
located in unsubsidized areas, this could be mis-interpreted as a failure of the fiscal 
incentive.  While the empirical application focuses on Brazil, the estimation strategy 
outlined in the paper has broader applicability and can be used to examine similar issues 
across countries.  
Our main findings are that subsidized credit offered to firms via the CF’s has 
worked in terms of industrialization in the Northeast.  At the same time, we find that pull 
of the headquarters has a much bigger effect on entry than the CF’s for the minority of 
vertically integrated firms (i.e., with headquarters).  This implies that, for vertically 
integrated industries, firm structure needs to play a part in the CF – i.e., reform to promote 
entry by headquarter firms into lagging regions.  In more footloose sectors, such reforms 
would not be necessary.   7
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections.  In Section 2, we 
discuss the design and allocation of the CF’s.  Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 
discusses our estimation strategy.  Section 5 describes the main findings and Section 6 
concludes.    
 
2. Allocation of Brazilian Constitutional Funds  
National governments in many countries have a long history of using fiscal 
incentives to stimulate the growth potential of lagging sub-national regions.  These 
spatially explicit programs are designed to compensate for location specific disadvantages, 
such as transport and logistics costs, infrastructure conditions, factor price differentials and 
lower levels of public services and amenities.  A detailed discussion on various regional 
development programs in Brazil is provided in Ferreira (2004) and World Bank (2005). 
Explicit spatial policies in Brazil include three sets of instruments which target private 
sector development through various kinds of subsidies: (a) fiscal incentive programs such 
as those administered by SUDENE, SUDAM, and the Zona Franca de Manaus (Manaus 
Free Trade Zone); (b) subsidized credit channeled through the CF’s, which has become one 
of the most important instruments of spatial policy in Brazil; (c) and regional development 
banks, such as Banco do Nordeste do Brazil (BNB). 
The focus of our analysis is on the effectiveness of subsidized credit channeled 
through the CF’s. In 1989, the Brazilian Congress instituted three Constitutional 
Investment Funds (Fundos Constitucionais de Financiamento) for the Northeast (FNE), the 
Center-West (FCO), and the North (FNO).  The main aim of these funds was to stimulate 
economic and social development in these regions by extending credit to local   8
entrepreneurs.  Preferential treatment was provided to micro- and small-scale agricultural 
producers and small-scale manufacturing to encourage the use of local raw materials and 
labor.  Sixty percent of the outlays for the CF’s were allocated to the Northeast, and 20 
percent were allocated to each of the North and the Center West.  Funds are transferred 
from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Integration (“Ministério da Integração”), 
which later reallocates them to the operating banks – the Banco do Nordeste (FNE), Banco 
da Amazônia (FNO) and Banco do Brasil (FCO).  The CF’s are financed by receipts from 
income taxes and taxes on industrial products. 
Interest rate subsidies are the main incentive offered through the CF’s. While 
market interest rates offered to private firms are currently more than 45%, the CF’s offer 
credit at 8.75% to non-agricultural micro firms; 10% to small firms, 12% to medium sized 
firms; and 14% to large enterprises.  Interest rates are even lower for comparable agro 
producers: 6% for mini-producers, 8.75% for small to average and 10.75% for large ones. 
These interest rates were negative in real terms in 2002, when inflation was 12.5%.    Rates 
offered to individual producers varied by sector, investment size, and credit record of the 
borrower.  Between 1989 and 2002, more than US $10 billion were provided in subsidized 
loans, which is about 0.8 % of the total GDP of the 3 regions per year (Ferreria 2004).  
 
3. Data 
We now describe the data used in the econometric exercises.  We created a working 
database that maps the spatial entry decisions of new establishments in Brazil, with the 
goal of learning how the CF’s affect those decisions.  The main source of information is   9
the RAIS micro data, provided by the Labor Ministry.
1  We study the effects of the CF’s 
on entry by firms in 18 sectors (11 manufacturing, 7 service) into 265 “urban 
agglomerations” (see description below) over the years 1993-2001.
2 
The RAIS database contains a vast range of information for all economic 
establishments in the formal sector in Brazil from 1986 onward.  For each establishment in 
this database, we have annual information on the number of employees at the beginning 
and end of each year; total salaries and wages; in which municipality the company is 
located; as well as the establishment’s economic activity according to several industry 
classifications.  To avoid problems caused by a large number of establishments with very 
few employees, we limit our analysis to establishments with no fewer than 10 employees.  
This paper is the first research project to use the RAIS data to study firm geography and 
the effectiveness of fiscal incentives. 
As discussed above, one important piece of information in the estimated models is 
the composition and location of the relatives for each establishment.  To uncover the 
composition of each family of establishments (parent and sibling establishments), which 
constitutes a firm, we make use of the establishment identification number, hereafter 
CNPJ.  The CNPJ has 14 digits and is the official identification number for all productive 
units in the formal sector.  The first 8 digits of the CNPJ indicate the company (or family) 
of each establishment. The next 4 digits indicate the position of the establishment in the 
family. For example, “0001” indicates the first establishment in the company, which is 
assumed in this paper to be the company headquarters.  The other establishments in the 
company are given sequential codes, so that the second establishment receives “0002”, the 
                                                 
1 The RAIS data was used under a cooperation agreement between the Labor Ministry and the Institute of 
Applied Economic Research (IPEA).    10
third establishment receives “0003”, and so on.  Some of the companies are composed by a 
single establishment, which receives the 4-digit code “0001”.
3  The last two digits of the 
CNPJ correspond to the establishment economic sector, and they work more as a 
confirmation code.  Therefore, we use the first 12 digits of the CNPJ to extract the 
establishment composition of each company. 
To summarize, there are three reasons why the RAIS data set is particularly useful 
for the analysis. These are: 
 
(i)  It identifies entry behavior each year, allowing us to build a panel of entry 
data that we use to control for spatial fixed effects. 
 
(ii)  It provides spatial detail on entry decisions (necessary for discussion of 
policies to promote entry into lagging regions). 
 
(iii)  It describes firm family structure (i.e., identifies parent or headquarters, 
which we find to be a particularly important determinant of entry). 
 
 
To model spatial entry decisions, we had to select an appropriate geographic unit. 
Using municipalities creates several problems: (i) there are a large number of 
municipalities (5,506 in the year 2000), which would significantly increase the 
computational burden in estimating the location decision model; (ii) many municipalities 
are very small (i.e., with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants) and/or in rural areas with very few 
establishments in the formal sector; (iii) because of the continuous creation of new 
municipalities in Brazil, it is necessary to coordinate different municipality maps across the 
                                                                                                                                                    
2  Refer to Table 5 for a list of the industries included in the analysis. 
3 The establishment with digits “0001” in positions 9 to 12 is the initial headquarters of the company.  
However, should the headquarters be transferred to another municipality and the previous establishment be 
maintained, the new headquarters may receive a four-digit sequence different from “0001” while the previous 
establishment retains the “0001” four-digit code, even though it is not the headquarters anymore.  On the 
other hand, it may happen that if the headquarters moves to another municipality, it will keep the same CNPJ, 
and in this case, we still have the headquarter with the “0001” code.  Even though we cannot identify these   11
years of study; and (iv) entry into municipalities within the same urban area is likely to be 
highly correlated.  Given these problems, we decided instead to use the concept of “urban 
agglomerations,” defined in a comprehensive urban study developed by IPEA, IBGE and 
Unicamp (2002), and used by Da Mata, Deichmann, Henderson, Lall and Wang (2005a 
and 2005b).  
Even though we had RAIS micro data available from 1986 to 2003, we found the 
data from 1993 to 2001 to be more reliable and therefore use only these years for the 
analysis.  For each year, we identified new establishments with at least 10 employees, and 
recorded the urban agglomeration in which they entered. If the entering establishment 
belonged to a multi-establishment firm, we also identified the agglomeration of the parent.  
As can be noted from Table 1, most parent establishments are located in the 
Southeast (58.15% in 1993).  Note, however, that the percentage of entering parent firms 
over the period 1993-2001 (i.e., the CF years) falls to 42.7% in the Southeast, but rises to 
21.01% in the Northeast (from 12.49% of the parents in 1993).  Thus, considering only the 
spatial distribution of parents (which are footloose by definition), there is some evidence 
that the CF’s were effective. There is also evidence in this table, however, that if branches 
are closely tied to parents, the CF’s have a lot to overcome in vertically integrated 
industries, given the initial distribution of parent firms in 1993. 
How empirically relevant is the “pull” of the parent firm?  The answer depends 
upon the sector being considered.  Table 2 shows percentage of entrants over years 1993-
2001 that have headquarters.  We would expect proximity to the parent to be particularly 
important for Metallurgy, Communcations and Electronics, Transportation, Chemicals, and 
                                                                                                                                                    
two situations from the data, the econometric results presented in the following sections show evidence of the 
importance of the “0001” headquarters location, which suggests the validity of our assumptions.   12
Shoes.  Table 2 also shows the average distance branch plants locate from headquarters 
(conditional on having a headquarters).  These numbers are very small, providing further 
evidence that the pull of the parent is significant. 
In addition to the role of firm family structure, we also explore the role played by a 
variety of other urban agglomeration attributes (e.g., indicators of economic development, 
infrastructure, education, and inter/intra-industry spillovers).
4  Table 3 summarizes these 
attributes by region, and Table 4 demonstrates that many of these variables are highly 
correlated with one another.  This will make it difficult to infer their separate causal roles. 
 
4. An Estimation Strategy to Examine the Impact of Regional Subsidies 
  Our estimation strategy is designed to answer the following questions: (i) were the 
CF’s effective in inducing firms to locate new establishments in Brazil’s lagging regions, 
(ii) what role does the spatial distribution of a multi-unit firm play in the location decision, 
and (iii) what local attributes are important factors in firms’ location decisions.  In 
answering these questions, we face a number of challenges.  First among these is 
separating the role of idiosyncratic firm characteristics from those of local attributes and 
CF allocations.  In particular, in deciding where to place a new branch plant, a multi-unit 
firm may take into account proximity to the firm’s headquarters.  The location of each 
firm’s headquarters will be unique, and it is unclear a priori in what direction ignoring this 
factor would bias our conclusions.
5 
                                                 
4 For further description of the variables used, refer to Da Mata, Deichmann, Henderson, Lall and Wang 
(2005a and 2005b).  
5 Given that most firms’ headquarters were located in the Southeast, our expectation is that failing to account 
for the pull of parent firms would lead us to overstate the quality of the Southeast region for entry by branch 
plants.  Because this region did not receive any CF support, this would likely have the effect of biasing 
downward the estimated impact of the CF’s.   13
Second, we must separate the role of the CF subsidies from that of unobserved 
local attributes.  The CF is a subsidy to promote entry into lagging regions.  Regions with 
high subsidies are therefore likely to be unattractive for entry in a variety of other 
dimensions.  Data to control parametrically for these other factors are incomplete, creating 
a problem of (negatively) correlated unobservables.  We exploit useful features of the 
RAIS data set to control for this problem with agglomeration fixed effects. 
Finally, in determining the role played by other factors in the entry decision (e.g., 
classical determinants like transportation cost and market size, along with agglomeration 
effects and other forms of local spillovers), we are confronted with problems of severe 
multicollinearity.  In Brazil, development (as measured by the IDH) is highly correlated 
with measures of education, infrastructure (e.g., sewage, electrification), and even transport 
accessibility.  This will limit our ability to deduce the separate causal role of many of these 
factors. 
  In dealing with these complications, we undertake a multi-stage estimation 
procedure.  The following sub-sections describe each of these stages.  The next section 




Stage #1:  Maximum Likelihood Entry Model 
  In the first stage, we recover non-parametric estimates of each agglomeration’s 
overall attractiveness for entry (separately for each sector), taking into account the 
possibility that a firm might consider the proximity of the new site to its headquarters.    14
Ceteris paribus, we should expect firms to dislike locating their plants long distances from 
the parent.  The magnitude (and even sign) of this effect, however, may differ by sector. 
We model the payoff to an entering plant i (part of firm k in industry m) from 
locating in agglomeration j in year t as:
6 
 










t j, δ    =  fixed effect capturing all features of agglomeration j in period t, as 
perceived by a potential entrant in industry m
7 
 
Di,j,k,t =  distance (km) to the parent of plant i from location j in year t ( = 0 
if no parent) 
 
ηi,j,k,t   =  unobserved idiosyncratic features of location j in year t specific to 
plant i from firm k 
 
We take the set of all entering firms in each year as given and model their entry decision 
over the set of all locations.
8  Assuming  k j i , , η  is distributed i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value, 
the probability that plant i enters agglomeration j in year t is given by: 
 
                                                 
6  While we estimate separate payoff function parameters for each sector, we do not differentiate between 
firms of different sizes in the current analysis.  Doing so will be important for future work, as previous 
research has found that larger firms may be more responsive to local variables in a model of spatial entry, 
either because of economies of scale in spatial search or because smaller firms may be more tied to the home 
of the entrepreneur. (Levinson 1996) 
7  At this stage of the model,  m
t j, δ  can be assumed to control for a wide variety of local attributes including 
(but not limited to) indicators of development (e.g., sewage, electrification, piped water), measures of 
transportation accessibility (e.g., cost of transporting freight to Sao Paulo), the education and income of the 
local population (e.g., average education of the population over age 25, illiteracy rate), market size (i.e., 
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The likelihood of the observed data (defined separately for each industry m and year t) is 
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where λi,j,t = 1 if plant i sites in agglomeration j in year t ( = 0 otherwise).  Maximizing this 
expression yields estimates of 
m




  A practical difficulty arises in this stage of the estimation.  In particular, some 
urban agglomerations may not be entered by any plants in an industry in a particular year.  
The data, therefore, reveal only that these locations are inherently undesirable, but do not 
indicate just how undesirable.  The fixed effects 
m
t j, δ  are not identified for these locations.  
This is fundamentally a censored data problem.  Unlike traditional approaches to this 
                                                                                                                                                    
8  More specifically, our estimation algorithm uses only the information contained in the share of new 
entrants choosing to locate in each agglomeration, and does not use the total number of new entrants for 
identification. 
9 Explicitly maximizing the likelihood function in (3) over the full vector of fixed effects 
m
t δ  may prove 
computationally difficult.  We therefore employ the contraction mapping proposed by Berry (1994) and used 
in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) to avoid this problem.  Practically, we integrate over entrants i in 
equation (2), yielding expressions for the predicted share of plants in each sector choosing to locate in each 
agglomeration in each year.  Given a guess for the value of 
m
t β , these expressions constitute a contraction 
mapping in the vector of  s
m
t j ' , δ .  We use this mapping to find the unique set of  s
m
t j ' , δ  that make the shares 
predicted by the model equal the actual shares within some acceptable level of tolerance.  The likelihood 
function is calculated based on these  s
m
t j ' , δ .  The parameter 
m
t β  is updated in such a way as to increase that   16
problem (which rely on strong distributional assumptions), we solve it by ascribing a very 
small minimum artificial number of entrants (e.g., 10
-6) to each agglomeration – a 
numerical “patch”.  Depending upon how small of a patch is assumed, the estimated values 
of 
m
t j, δ  for each un-entered agglomeration can be arbitrarily negative.  Timmins and 
Murdock (2005) demonstrate that, as the patch size becomes increasingly small, the 
estimated values of 
m
t j, δ  for those agglomerations that are entered converge to stable 
values.  As long as a majority of agglomerations are entered by each sector, median 
regression used to recover the determinants of 
m
t j, δ  will be unaffected by the artificially 
assumed number of entrants in un-entered agglomerations.
10 
 
Stage #2:  Median Regression and the Role of the Constitutional Funds 
  In order to evaluate the role of the CF’s in promoting entry, we use median 
















                                                                                                                                                    
likelihood value, and the contraction mapping is repeated in order to recover new s
m
t j ' , δ .  The procedure is 
complete when the likelihood function is maximized. 
10 See Koenker and Basset (1978) and Koenker and Hallock (2001) for comprehensive discussions of median 
regression. 
11  Note that estimating this equation via median regression requires explicit estimation of all fixed effects – 
differencing the data is not equivalent to fixed effect estimation in the median regression context.   17
t YEAR   =  vector of dummy variables indicating year = 1994, …, 2001 
(1993 excluded) 
 
t AGG    = vector of dummy variables indicating agglomeration = 2, …, 265 
(agglomeration 1 excluded) 
 





t j u ,   =  unobservable determinant of entry quality in agglomeration j for 
firms in sector m in year t  
 
The vector of year dummies is included to account for the fact that an arbitrary 
normalization underlies the vector of 
m
t δ  in each year t (in particular, these fixed effects 
have no natural scale, so we normalize them so that their average values equal zero in each 
year for each industry). 
  The vector of agglomeration dummies plays an especially important role in this 
regression.  In particular, CF’s are allocated in a remedial fashion (i.e., with more funds 
being allocated toward locations that are less attractive for entry).
13  A regression of 
m
t j, δ  
on only year dummies and CF allocations therefore suffers from an omitted variable bias – 
in particular, a bias towards finding that the CF’s had no impact (or even an adverse 
                                                 
12  In particular, we take the ex post contracted allocation of CF’s in each state in each year and divide by the 
number of entering plants.  This controls for the fact that attractive states experiencing more entry will, by 
definition, receive more CF allocations.  The size of the entering firms will also have an effect on the overall 
allocation each state receives (bigger firms will receive larger subsidies than small firms).  We therefore 
divide by the average firm size (i.e., employees per firm) amongst entrants in each state in each year.  This 
converts our measure of CF’s into the average contracted allocation per employee in each state, which we 
treat as an exogenous measure of the state’s attractiveness in terms of the CF.  Note one remaining potential 
source of bias – firms with better credit ratings will receive higher CF subsidies (conditional upon size).  If 
firms with better credit ratings disproportionately locate in sites with desirable unobservables, the error in our 
CF measure will be correlated with those unobservables, biasing our results towards finding positive effects 
of the CF’s.   We demonstrate below, however, that this potential source of bias is not a concern in 
interpreting our results. 
13  This is apparent when one considers that the Funds were only made available to firms entering in the 
Northeast, North, and Center-West regions, in order to help draw them away from the more affluent South 
and Southeast.   18
impact) on entry behavior.  With only cross-sectional data, one would be forced to deal 
with this fact by including as many agglomeration attributes in the model as possible.  
While such data exist, they will necessarily be incomplete.  With our panel data (obtained 
by using annual entry behavior observed in the RAIS), we are able to control non-
parametrically for any features of each agglomeration that do not change over time.  This 
takes care of the most important differences between agglomerations, and leaves us with 
the variation in CF allocations over time with which to identify their impact. 
 
Stage #3:   Decomposing Agglomeration Fixed Effects 
  In the final stage of our estimation procedure, we explore the role of determinants 
of entry behavior besides the CF’s.  At the end of Stage #2, we are left with the vector of 
agglomeration-and-industry fixed effects, 
m φ .  These fixed effects describe the 
attractiveness of each agglomeration for each industry m, averaged over the period 1993-
2001, after having controlled for headquarter locations, time effects, and CF allocations.  
Ideally, we could take these fixed effects and regress them on a vector of city attributes; 
e.g., Xj = {IDH, education, infrastructure, employment in sector m (i.e., agglomeration 
effects), employment in other sectors (i.e., spillover effects)}.  In practice, this is 
complicated by two factors.  First, many of these attributes are highly correlated with one 
another (see Table 4).  Results of such a procedure are therefore highly sensitive to the 
exact specification assumed.  Second, it is likely that some of these attributes are actually 
determined by the entry behavior of firms, and are therefore endogenous to the regression.  
This is especially true of the aggregated entry decisions of other firms.  In this case, a 
simple decomposition like that described above would yield biased estimates.   19
  Even without determining the causal effect of agglomeration attributes on 
m φ , we 
can learn something about which attributes are more closely associated with entry.  In 
particular, for each industry, we divide agglomerations into two groups according to the 
median value of 
m
j φ  – “l” = low (i.e., below the median) and “h” = high (i.e., above the 
median): 
 












h Median j φ φ > = Ω  
 
 
Agglomerations in the group labeled 
m
l Ω  are generally less attractive destinations for new 
entrants in sector m (controlling for CF allocations, other time-varying local 
unobservables, and the spatial distribution of firm headquarters).  We then take the mean of 
each agglomeration attribute within each group, and look for significant differences.   
While not evidence of a causal effect, a significant difference does imply a tendency for 
certain kinds of firms to gravitate toward destinations with certain kinds of attributes.  This 
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5.  Results 
The Role of Parent Location in Entry 
  Table 5 reports the results of our first stage estimates of 
m
t β  for each of eighteen 
sectors.
14  In every instance, firms exhibit a statistically significant preference for siting 
their new plants close to their headquarters.  In recovering these effects, Stage #1 of our 
estimation strategy non-parametrically controls for everything about agglomerations that 
varies by sector and year and that might be a determinant of firm entry.  This should 
control for the most important confounding factors (i.e., for any factor that makes it 
attractive to put any firm from a particular sector – headquarters or otherwise – in the 
agglomeration).  It cannot distinguish, however, between distance effects and the effect of 
idiosyncratic unobservables.
15 
While providing evidence of statistical significance, the parameter estimates in 
Table 5 do not, however, allow us to judge the economic significance of the “pull” of the 
firm headquarters in plant location decisions.  In particular, in each of the maximum 
likelihood procedures underlying the estimates reported in Table 5, there is a vector of 
fixed effects normalized so that their average value equals zero.  This normalization is 
arbitrary, and makes direct comparison of parameter estimates across years or industries 
impossible.  More can be learned about the way in which these firm headquarters influence 
entry behavior by way of simulation.  In particular, it is possible to simulate how entry 
patterns would have differed by sector and region if firms did not care about proximity to 
                                                 
14  Estimates of  m
t j, δ  are not reported for the sake of brevity, but will be used in the following sub-section to 
explore the role of the CF’s. 
15  For example, the model would interpret a case in which an entrepreneur has a strong preference for a 
particular agglomeration and locates all of his plants and headquarters there as a distaste for locating branch 
plants far from the headquarters.   21
headquarters.  Assuming that the values of 
m
t j, δ  are not affected by this counterfactual 
assumption,
16 we simply “turn off” the distance-to-parent coefficient in the entry model, 
and simulate new entry patterns in each year.  Table 6 reports the percent change in the 
distribution of entry (i.e., between actual and predicted under this counterfactual 
assumption), across regions and aggregated over the years 1993-2001.  The biggest 
differences are seen in the North (i.e., where relatively few headquarters were in place in 
any sector, but which sees the biggest gains when distance-to-parent effects are taken out) 
and in the Southeast (i.e., the home to the majority of headquarters, which sees the largest 
drop in entry).  The Northeast, Center-West, and South see mixed effects that vary by 
sector, although the general trend is for entry to increase in these sectors when we make all 
plants “footloose”. 
 
The Effectiveness of the Constitutional Funds 
  Table 7 describes our decomposition of the fixed effects, 
m
t j, δ .  Columns describe 
the results of median regressions that (i) exclude agglomeration fixed effects, using only 
year fixed effects and annual CF contracts per employee, (ii) use year fixed effects and 
annual CF contracts per employee along with a collection of covariates describing 
observable agglomeration attributes,
17 and (iii) use year fixed effects, agglomeration fixed 
effects, and annual CF allocations.  In the table, we report only the coefficient on the CF 
variable.  Without any controls for agglomeration heterogeneity in column (i), we find 
                                                 
16 If entry by firms in one year makes a region more attractive for entry by firms in the same and other sectors 
in later years, this assumption implies that we will understate the impact of removing parent effects on 
lagging regions. 
17  In particular, we use the average of the 1990 and 2000 Human Development Indices, populations, and 
average years of education of those over the age of 25, along with the 1995 transportation cost to Sao Paulo. 
1995.   22
significant (both economically and statistically) negative effects of the CF on entry.  This 
result corresponds to that found in previous work (Ferreira 2004) and likely reflects the 
fact that the CF’s are allocated in a remedial fashion.  Including covariates in column (ii) to 
control for local attributes does little to change these results. 
Time-invariant forms of heterogeneity are non-parametrically controlled for by the 
introduction of agglomeration fixed effects.  These are included in the specification 
described in column (iii), where we find significant positive effects of the CF’s on entry 
for five out of the eleven manufacturing industries, and positive but insignificant effects 
for all but paper and publishing and metallurgy (where effects are negative and 
insignificant). 
While the fixed effects succeed in alleviating the downward bias in the CF 
parameters that is evident in columns (i) and (ii), keep in mind that there still may be some 
remaining downward bias caused by time varying forms of local heterogeneity that are 
negatively correlated with CF allocations.  We are less concerned with the potential for 
bias introduced by the mis-measurement of CF allocations resulting from the non-random 
siting of plants according to their credit rating (see footnote 12).  In particular, we would 
expect that firms with more talented entrepreneurs would have better credit ratings and that 
these entrepreneurs would be more likely to site plants in locations with desirable 
unobservable attributes.  This would tend to bias the coefficient on CF in our median 
regressions upward.  This source of bias should go down, however, when we introduce 
agglomeration fixed effects to account for time-invariant forms of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  It is precisely when we introduce these fixed effects, however, that the sign 
of most of our CF effects increases dramatically, switching from negative to positive.     23
Clearly, if there had been an upward bias in the absence of these fixed effects, it was not 
very big and was swamped by the bias introduced by the correlation between CF and 
undesirable unobservable local attributes. 
  Of the non-manufacturing sectors, only retail, transportation and communication, 
and hotel and food services show positive effects from the CF’s.  Non-manufacturing 
sectors are generally not covered by the CF’s, so we should not expect to see the positive 
effect here that we saw in the case of most manufacturing industries.  Entry in the retail 
sector, however, may quickly follow manufacturing entry and, hence, exhibit a positive 
correlation with CF.  In addition, the CF’s have been used to promote tourism related 
activities, which may influence firm entry in the hotel and food services and transportation 
and communication sectors (Ferreira 2004). 
  In general, our results suggest that the CF’s, by themselves, have stimulated entry 
in the lagging regions of Brazil – particularly in the case of machinery, transportation 
equipment, wood and furniture, textiles, and food and beverages.  In order to put the role 
of the CF’s in perspective, consider the reduction in distance-to-parent that would be 
required to compensate for taking them away – i.e., a compensating variation (CV) in 
distance-to-parent.  These are described in Table 8.  We find that distance to parent would 
have to fall by between 5 and 26% to compensate for the loss of the CF’s, holding firm 
payoffs constant.  This CV is smaller for plants in the Northeast (where CF allocations per 
employee are smaller on average), and for industries more sensitive to distance-to-parent 
(e.g., Food, Beverages, and Alcohol). 
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Other Determinants of Entry Behavior 
  Tables 9 (a)-(i) report the results of our exploratory analysis of the other possible 
determinants of plant entry. These results are based on decomposing the agglomeration-
industry fixed effects, which we get from Stage #2. As we discuss in Section 4, these 
decompositions do not establish causality in terms of other factors that make certain 
regions more attractive for some industries, but still help us identify attributes which are 
closely associated with firm entry.  
  Firm entry in all manufacturing sectors and most non-manufacturing sectors is 
higher in agglomerations with lower transport costs to Sao Paulo. Similarly, 
agglomerations with better development indicators as measured by the IDH, education 
attainment, and availability of public services (such as garbage collection and piped water 
availability) have higher firm entry in most sectors. 
  One would also expect that new firms would locate in areas which have higher 
representation of firms in their own or inter related industries. However, the evidence to 
support the importance of agglomeration economies is limited.
18 Only in the machinery 
and textiles industries do we find that a higher presence of firms in the same industry is 
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6.   Conclusions  
  We learn two things from this analysis.  First, (contrary to previous work) we find 
that the CF allocations have, in fact, been successful in inducing entry into lagging regions, 
conditioning on the location of firms’ headquarters.  This result however, can be easily lost 
among the confounding effects of local unobservables that are negatively correlated with 
CF allocations.  It is hard to capture these determinants of entry with available data 
describing agglomeration attributes, but without properly accounting for these factors, 
there is a bias toward finding a negative effect of the CF’s.  The RAIS data, which describe 
spatial entry behavior on an annual basis, provide a unique opportunity to overcome this 
problem non-parametrically. 
  Second, we learn that, while the CF’s were successful, headquarter proximity is a 
significant determinant of entry behavior (conditional upon having a parent) that works to 
offset this success.  Simply “turning-off” the effect of parent firm location significantly 
raises overall entry into lagging regions.  These effects are, moreover, likely a lower bound 
on the effect of removing the pull of firm headquarters if we believe that there are positive 
spillovers between entrants. 
  The conclusions of this paper for policy-makers are, unfortunately, limited.  While 
we find that the CF’s were successful in inducing firms to locate in Brazil’s lagging 
regions (and that the CF’s may yield more “bang for the buck” if they are used to induce 
entry by firms’ headquarters into those regions), we are unable to determine whether the 
CF’s were good policy or not.  In further research, we plan to move from the limited 
question of “do subsidies affect firm location decisions” to the more policy-relevant 
                                                                                                                                                    
18 These findings are consistent with Lall, Funderburg, and Yepes (2005) who examine the effect of transport 
costs and agglomeration economies on manufacturing wages in Brazil. They find that while wages are higher   26
question of “are these subsidies welfare enhancing”.  In answering that question, it will be 
crucial to determine (i) whether the CF’s induced new entry into lagging regions or simply 
re-allocated entry away from the South and Southeast regions, and (ii) what was the 
productivity effect on re-located firms.
19  Answering these questions was not possible with 
the data used in this paper, but may require new efforts in collecting survey data from 
entrepreneurs about what motivated their entry decisions, and about their inputs and 
outputs conditional upon those decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                    
in regions with improvements in transport networks, agglomeration economies have very modest effects. 
19 In addition to informing us on the value of the CF’s, this latter point will speak to the question of whether 
or not there is generally a tradeoff between regional distribution objectives and national economic growth.  
This question has broad implications beyond the current study.   27
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Table 1 – Spatial distribution of Firm Headquarters in 1993 
 
 
State/Region  Distribution of Parent Firms (1993)  Entry by Parent Firms 
(1993-2001) 
  Firm Count  %  Firm Count  % 
Rondonia 157  0.71  195  1.33 
Acre 49  0.22  33  0.23 
Amazons 211  0.95  194  1.33 
Roraima 24  0.11  39  0.27 
Para 304  1.38  248  1.70 
Amapa 47  0.21  42  0.29 
Tocantins 124  0.56  41  0.28 
North  916  4.14  792  5.42 
Maranhao 172  0.78  224  1.53 
Piaui 145  0.66  122  0.83 
Ceara 494  2.23  509  3.48 
Rio Grande do Norte  177  0.80  218  1.49 
Paraiba 136  0.62  219  1.50 
Pernambuco 612  2.77  609  4.17 
Alagoas 135  0.61  153  1.05 
Sergipe 127  0.57  122  0.83 
Bahia 763  3.45  895  6.12 
Northeast  2761  12.49  3071  21.01 
Minas Gerais  2064  9.34  1339  9.16 
Espirito Santo  472  2.13  301  2.06 
Rio de Janeiro  2673  12.09  1101  .53 
Sao Paulo  7648  34.59  3499  23.94 
Southeast  12857  58.15  6240  42.70 
Parana 1400  6.33  1026  7.02 
Santa Catarina  957  4.33  871  5.96 
Rio Grande do Sul  1700  7.69  746  5.10 
South  4057  18.35  2643  18.09 
Mato Grosso do Sul  220  1.00  207  1.42 
Mato Grosso  325  1.47  549  3.76 
Goias 534  2.42  614  4.20 
Distrito Federal  439  1.99  498  3.41 
Center-West  1518  6.87  1868  12.78 
Brazil  22109  100.00  14614  100.00   30
Table 2 – Entrant Descriptive Statistics 
% Entrants with Parent Firms and Average Distance 
to Parent Firm After Entry (Conditional on Having Parent)  
 
 
IBGE Sector  Percent Entrants with 
Parent 
Avg. Distance to 
Parent (km) 
Metallurgy  15.15    48.41 
Machinery    1.56  143.50 
Communications and Electronic Equipment  15.81    38.80 
Transportation Equipment  16.04  119.83 
Wood and Furniture    1.59    80.11 
Paper and Publishing    2.86    99.18 
Rubber, Tobacco, and Skins    0.99    68.95 
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Veterinary & Perfume Products  13.47    80.08 
Textiles    1.24    67.00 
Shoes  14.22 104.07 
Food, Beverages, and Alcohol    0.99    79.07 
Retail    2.33    94.86 
Credit Institutions, Insurance, & Capitalization  41.63    52.81 
Real Estate  16.71 123.26 
Transportation & Communication    2.51  107.73 
Hotel and Food      2.65    56.98 
Medical, Veterinary, and Dentistry Services  14.40    29.22 
Education  61.63 134.96 
   31




 North  Northeast  Southeast  South  Center-West 
Number of Agglomerations  11  102  94  38  20 
Population (1991)  522092.0  223036.7 508593.2 400874.6  394631.7 
Transportation Cost to Sao Paulo (1995) 3617.85  2391.48  460.07  830.49  1372.84 
Human Development Index (1990)  0.68  0.57  0.75  0.74  0.70 
Average Years of Education, 25 years and Older (1991)  4.51  3.09  5.38  5.30  4.52 
% Households Garbage Collection (1991)  50.86  56.05  85.47  84.17  67.13 
% Households Electric Lighting (1991)  78.86  72.50  97.20  94.49  83.67 
% Households Piped Water (1991)  49.48  46.82  92.31  88.50  69.31 
Theil Index (1991)  0.60  0.57  0.52  0.52  0.57 
Employment:  Mining  1158.69  315.73 715.88 562.09  756.73 
Employment: Agriculture  32477.42  13151.70  7436.58  23281.34  24748.08 
Employment: Commerce  29604.55  12154.11 31590.26 26244.20  24762.45 
Employment: Construction  11823.70  5502.84  16752.00  12790.92  12553.95 
Employment: Finance  1547.63  829.10  4364.00  2922.67  2526.63 
Employment:  Fishing  1586.76  513.09 189.65 404.78  172.75 
Manufacturing Employment: Chemicals  331.00 453.78 3021.86 880.76  639.02 
Manufacturing Employment: Electrical  3577.45  112.22  1891.81  1106.76  132.65 
Manufacturing Employment: Food  2490.91  1776.09  5134.47  5165.89  2538.37 
Manufacturing Employment: Furniture 1567.45  579.17  2009.76  2379.74  1337.46 
Manufacturing Employment: Leather 16.09  51.26  236.36  667.26  61.20 
Manufacturing Employment: Machinery  377.09  118.72  1737.57  1432.47  177.60 
Manufacturing Employment: Metals  1408.45  693.58  8591.06  4380.76  983.22 
Manufacturing Employment: Paper 145.45  84.42  941.97  661.24  41.65 
Manufacturing Employment: Petroleum  101.27  179.88  366.93  260.42  8.95 
Manufacturing Employment: Plastics 316.82  175.69  1874.13  1117.37  135.50 
Manufacturing Employment: Printing  630.64  281.65  2086.48  1055.89  771.85 
Manufacturing Employment: Textiles  555.64  1444.08  6751.52  4325.50  1190.29 
Manufacturing Employment: Tobacco 50.09  56.11  82.01  414.16  3.10 
Manufacturing Employment: Transportation 1278.64  210.52  3598.91  1493.45  446.65 
Manufacturing Employment: Wood  3631.82  470.56  795.14  1856.05  1940.73 
                                                 
20 Manufacturing employment measured in 1991.  All other employments are the average of 1980 and 2000 values.   32
















Population  1.0000         
Transportation  Cost  -0.0831  1.0000       
Human  Development  Index  0.1974  -0.7112  1.0000      
Avg Education (> 25 Years)  0.2634  -0.6114  0.9477  1.0000     
% Garbage  0.1278  -0.6626  0.7423  0.7086  1.0000     
% Electric Lighting  0.1514  -0.6064  0.8434  0.8631  0.7693  1.0000   
% Piped Water  0.1438  -0.7763  0.9159  0.8879  0.8377  0.9074  1.0000   33
Table 5 (a) – First Stage Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors 






























1993 -4.63335  -1.022509 -3.516901  -4.11691 -0.003287 -0.744992 -1.529242  -2.251017  -3.63653 
  0.061  0.091  0.586  0.249  0.156  0.242  0.252  0.366  0.351 
1994 -4.776536  -1.026642  -2.267564  -2.065258 -2.361189 -2.319109 -2.237593  -1.247121  -2.6326 
  0.055  0.098  0.302  0.097  0.244  0.359  0.498  0.221  0.248 
1995 -4.19655  -1.312279 -7.136356  -2.911339  -2.316447 -1.747716 -1.770898  -0.5976185  -2.77249 
  0.047  0.101  0.853  0.104  0.262  0.379  0.522  0.189  0.256 
1996 -4.379192  -1.550118 -0.9575031  -1.989933  -2.2154 -1.124324 -1.67246  -1.791051  -3.78178 
  0.044  0.092  0.202  0.092  0.25  0.532  0.296  0.272  0.258 
1997 -4.660394  -1.374413  -2.661697  -2.125658 -2.734079 -1.923401 -1.569216  -2.543844  -2.03109 
  0.052  0.105  0.302  0.085  0.263  0.358  0.304  0.321  0.219 
1998 -4.666001  -0.9885217 -2.281698  -1.123402 -2.105364 -1.66395 -0.4725547  -0.7038555  -3.33133 
  0.051  0.09  0.334  0.08  0.326  0.31  0.283  0.293  0.263 
1999 -4.443977  -1.245524  -3.662842  -1.525596  -1.7404 -0.896037  -0.8281909 -0.5695767  -2.83038 
  0.049  0.102  0.309  0.09  0.252  0.226  0.205  0.212  0.261 
2000 -3.780393  -0.9067607 -4.836069  -1.881727 -3.321722 -0.495014 -1.316868  -1.457993  -2.84382 
  0.039  0.092  0.37  0.095  0.402  0.255  0.3  0.252  0.205 
2001 -4.211293  -1.501673  -5.994211  -1.51965  -1.665818 -0.843011 -1.056535  -2.138744  -2.3295 
  0.047  0.104  0.652  0.079  0.252  0.315  0.218  0.263  0.219 
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Table 5 (b) – First Stage Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors 
































1993 -1.616734 -3.513587  -3.3916  -1.61772  -3.519285 -1.531885  -2.702976  -5.121686  -0.701798 
  0.178  0.235  0.296  0.21  0.263  0.078  0.083  0.33  0.079 
1994 -0.794549 -2.402769  -5.2069  -1.467135  -1.448544 -0.8352789  -2.776254 -2.500844 -0.724495 
  0.123  0.164  0.503  0.121  0.197  0.08  0.08  0.134  0.075 
1995 -1.367163 -5.365632 -2.93199  -2.095078  -1.546453 -0.7119592  -3.089777 -2.815874 -0.946609 
  0.161  0.257  0.244  0.183  0.242  0.06  0.07  0.096  0.082 
1996 -1.772667 -6.043686 -3.24486  -1.497497  -0.6497825 -1.213721 -3.191817 -4.031057 -0.276271 
  0.154  0.394  0.318  0.123  0.159  0.076  0.073  0.146  0.06 
1997 -1.915038 -4.268064 -2.64443  -1.946985  -2.492992 -0.979042  -3.344391  -3.138312  -0.935676 
  0.139  0.198  0.253  0.343  0.416  0.06  0.079  0.112  0.08 
1998 -1.022172  -2.55246  -2.28974  -2.53005  -1.577432 -1.054577  -3.178292  -3.240311  -1.002077 
  0.152  0.171  0.254  0.193  0.257  0.069  0.091  0.129  0.07 
1999 -2.028531 -5.887606 -2.42505  -1.51752  -0.9626081 -1.531746 -3.103625 -4.144922 -0.730447 
  0.164  0.423  0.32  0.206  0.156  0.074  0.073  0.154  0.073 
2000 -1.467654 -4.492109 -1.76989  -1.32374  -1.138835 -1.272506  -3.2621  -4.383683  -0.501083 
  0.127  0.251  0.255  0.176  0.172  0.072  0.073  0.172  0.064 
2001 -1.249875 -1.183984 -2.58689  -2.035496  -3.001961 -1.286532  -3.162523  -4.747407  -0.312585 
  0.122  0.14  0.239  0.243  0.309  0.06  0.065  0.138  0.07 





Table 6 – Percent Change in Predicted Entry With and 
Without “Distance to Parent” Effects (1993-2001) 
 
IBGE Sector  North  Northeast  Southeast South  Center-West 
Metallurgy 0.17  -0.05  -0.05  0.03  0.08 
Machinery  0.06  0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 
Communications and Electronic Equipment  0.26  -0.09 -0.24 -0.01 0.04 
Transportation  Equipment  0.22  0.03 -0.13 -0.05 0.02 
Wood and Furniture  0.06  0.04  -0.02  0.03  0.03 
Paper and Publishing  0.08  0.05  -0.02  0.05  0.04 
Rubber, Tobacco, and Skins  0.06  0.02  -0.01  -0.02  0.01 
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Veterinary & Perfume Products  0.10  0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.05 
Textiles  0.07  0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.04 
Shoes  0.13  0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.05 
Food, Beverages, and Alcohol  0.05  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.02 
Retail 0.09  -0.02  -0.06  0.00  0.02 
Credit Institutions, Insurance, & Capitalization  0.54  -0.31 -0.47 -0.12 -0.15 
Real  Estate  0.07 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 
Transportation & Communication  0.10  0.05  -0.03  0.03  0.03 
Hotel and Food    0.10  0.02  -0.04  0.04  0.06 
Medical, Veterinary, and Dentistry Services  0.17  0.08 -0.08 0.04 0.04 
Education  0.41  0.17 -0.27 -0.05 -0.09 
   36




 (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
Manufacturing Sectors 
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Year Fixed Effects 
 




No Yes  No 
 
Agglomeration Fixed Effects 
 
No No  Yes 
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Table 8 – Compensating Variation in Distance-to-Parent (km) 
From Elimination of Constitutional Fund
21 




  Industry 
Average 
Distance to 























































Average CF Per Employee 
 
788.17 619.30 1052.91 
                                                 
21 Evaluated at the average CF allocation per employee by region, and using the 1996 first-stage parameter estimate on 
distance-to-parent.   38





















Population  466848.86 284228.02 182620.84 1.21 516687.30  234764.29 281923.01  1.88 
Transportation Cost  1188.97  1722.15 -533.18  -4.22  1162.14 1748.77 -586.63  -4.67 
Human Development Index  0.70  0.64 0.06 5.93 0.70 0.64 0.07 6.33 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.80 3.97 0.83 5.10 4.85 3.92 0.93 5.82 
% Garbage Collection  75.87  66.45 9.42  3.64 75.58  66.73 8.84  3.40 
% Electric Lighting  89.47  81.60 7.87  3.93 90.16  80.92 9.24  4.66 
% Piped Water  78.51  63.02  15.49 5.22 78.99  62.54 16.45  5.58 
Theil Index  0.54  0.55  -0.01  -0.72 0.54 0.56 -0.02 -1.54 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  673.71  449.67  224.04  1.39  758.82 365.20 393.63  2.47 
    Agriculture  13380.95  15121.28  -1740.33 -0.60 15196.59  13319.29 1877.30  0.65 
    Commerce  28349.58  17182.24  11167.34 1.22 31530.09  14025.64 17504.45  1.92 
    Construction  14092.56  8593.65  5498.91 1.24  15781.35  6917.56 8863.79  2.02 
    Finance  3515.89  1573.73  1942.16 1.25 3893.04  1199.41 2693.64  1.73 
    Fishing  411.32  392.17  19.14 0.16  449.40  354.37 95.03  0.80 
    Manufacturing  18452.14  10015.74  8436.40 1.23  21245.28  7243.59 14001.69  2.05 
        - Chemicals  2183.99  691.31  1492.68 1.35 2325.42 550.94 1774.48  1.61 
        - Electrical Equipment  1706.77  361.24  1345.52 1.59 1822.93 245.95 1576.98  1.87 
        - Food  4420.57  2667.35  1753.22 1.28 5077.45  2015.40 3062.05  2.26 
        - Furniture  1898.86  990.70 908.16  1.40  2077.24 813.66 1263.58  1.96 
        - Leather  179.99  228.91 -48.92  -0.32  326.40 83.60 242.80  1.57 
        - Machinery  1362.23  434.29 927.95  1.65  1513.27 284.39 1228.87  2.20 
        - Metal  6040.52  2124.69  3915.83 1.53 6781.55  1389.23 5392.32  2.12 
        - Paper  739.31  203.96 535.35  1.65  805.33 138.44 666.88  2.07 
        - Petroleum  268.30  215.14 53.16  0.29  322.99  160.85 162.14  0.87 
        - Plastics  1459.48  376.63  1082.85 1.24 1619.62  217.69 1401.93  1.61 
        - Printing  1638.22  534.66  1103.56 1.28 1789.23  384.79 1404.44  1.63 
        - Textiles  5528.35  1853.26  3675.09 1.69 5886.08  1498.22 4387.85  2.02 
        - Tobacco  79.02  145.51 -66.50  -0.64  174.00 51.24 122.76  1.18 
        - Transportation Equipment  2528.78  794.89  1733.89 1.36 2714.15 610.92 2103.23  1.66 
        - Wood Products  1173.11  881.09 292.02  0.98  1238.77 815.91  422.86  1.43 
   39








Mean (Low)  Difference  t-statistic  Mean (High) Mean  (Low)  Difference  t-statistic 
Population  492318.75 258949.62 233369.13 1.55 455359.19  295631.29 159727.90  1.06 
Transportation Cost  1285.33  1626.51 -341.18  -2.65  1227.90 1683.51 -455.61  -3.57 
Human Development Index  0.69  0.65 0.05 4.20 0.70 0.64 0.06 5.29 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.71 4.06 0.65 3.93 4.79 3.98 0.82 5.01 
% Garbage Collection  73.39  68.90 4.49  1.70 76.03  66.28 9.75  3.77 
% Electric Lighting  88.95  82.12 6.82  3.38 89.74  81.34 8.40  4.21 
% Piped Water  76.19  65.33  10.86 3.57 78.24  63.29 14.94  5.02 
Theil  Index  0.55 0.54 0.01 1.08 0.55 0.55 0.00 0.04 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  711.82  411.85  299.96  1.87  628.45 494.59 133.86  0.83 
    Agriculture  16666.24  11860.70  4805.54 1.68  14576.50  13934.72 641.78  0.22 
    Commerce  29868.52  15674.72  14193.80 1.55 27672.86  17853.87 9818.99  1.07 
    Construction  14820.09  7871.59  6948.51 1.58  13555.70  9126.47 4429.23  1.00 
    Finance  3696.21  1394.76  2301.45 1.48 3463.22  1626.00 1837.22  1.18 
    Fishing  472.14  331.80  140.34 1.18 406.90  396.56  10.34  0.09 
    Manufacturing  18879.96  9591.13  9288.83 1.36  18382.39  10084.96 8297.43  1.21 
        - Chemicals  2085.70  788.86  1296.84 1.17 2044.73 829.52 1215.21  1.10 
        - Electrical Equipment  1628.42  438.99  1189.43 1.41 1629.47 437.95 1191.51  1.41 
        - Food  4469.39  2618.89  1850.49 1.36 4505.27  2583.29 1921.98  1.41 
        - Furniture  1937.45  952.41 985.04  1.52  1835.49 1053.59  781.90  1.21 
        - Leather  306.58  103.27 203.31  1.32  310.12 99.76 210.36  1.36 
        - Machinery  1269.36  526.46 742.90  1.32  1311.61 484.53  827.09  1.47 
        - Metal  5955.74  2208.83  3746.91 1.46 5689.35  2473.21 3216.14  1.26 
        - Paper  670.37  272.38 397.99  1.23  659.97 282.71 377.26  1.16 
        - Petroleum  282.92  200.62 82.31  0.44  281.02 202.50  78.52  0.42 
        - Plastics  1434.48  401.44  1033.05 1.19 1451.55  384.50 1067.04  1.22 
        - Printing  1668.93  504.18  1164.75 1.35 1620.70  552.05 1068.66  1.24 
        - Textiles  4650.24  2724.77  1925.47 0.88 5064.33  2313.79 2750.55  1.26 
        - Tobacco  163.90  61.26 102.64  0.99  169.23 55.98 113.25  1.09 
        - Transportation Equipment  2320.51 1001.60 1318.91  1.03  2340.65 981.61 1359.04  1.07 
        - Wood Products  1241.92  812.79 429.13  1.45  1036.76 1016.41  20.35  0.07 
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Population  443593.76 307308.26 136285.49 0.90 414033.86  336645.90 77387.96  0.51 
Transportation Cost  1113.73  1796.82 -683.09  -5.52  1162.24 1748.68 -586.44  -4.67 
Human Development Index  0.70  0.64 0.06 5.52 0.70 0.64 0.06 5.88 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.77 4.00 0.77 4.73 4.80 3.97 0.83 5.09 
% Garbage Collection  76.70  65.62 11.09  4.32  75.16 67.14 8.02  3.07 
% Electric Lighting  89.71  81.37 8.33  4.17 89.79  81.28 8.51  4.27 
% Piped Water  78.85  62.68  16.17 5.48 78.39  63.14 15.25  5.14 
Theil Index  0.53  0.56  -0.03  -2.31 0.53 0.57 -0.04 -3.57 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  590.54  532.22  58.32  0.36 549.14  573.30 -24.16  -0.15 
    Agriculture  12098.38  16394.21  -4295.84 -1.50 13036.39  15463.25 -2426.86  -0.84 
    Commerce  26940.14  18581.08  8359.06 0.91  24891.10  20614.72 4276.38  0.47 
    Construction  13356.35  9324.32  4032.02 0.91  12304.95  10367.82 1937.14  0.44 
    Finance  3419.20  1669.69  1749.51 1.12 3137.47  1949.29 1188.18  0.76 
    Fishing  352.66  450.39  -97.72 -0.82 384.63  418.66 -34.03  -0.29 
    Manufacturing  18051.95  10412.92  7639.03 1.11  16974.39  11482.38 5492.01  0.80 
        - Chemicals  2294.27  581.86  1712.41 1.55 2101.41 773.27 1328.13  1.20 
        - Electrical Equipment  1777.38  291.16  1486.22 1.76 1370.95 694.53  676.41  0.80 
        - Food  4264.71  2822.03  1442.68 1.06 4002.42  3082.35 920.08  0.67 
        - Furniture  1838.81  1050.30 788.51  1.22  1648.16 1239.52  408.64  0.63 
        - Leather  204.33  204.76  -0.43 0.00  177.42  231.47 -54.05  -0.35 
        - Machinery  1348.86  447.56 901.29  1.61  1284.97 510.97  774.00  1.38 
        - Metal  5833.08  2330.56  3502.52 1.37 5616.33  2545.69 3070.64  1.20 
        - Paper  745.12  198.20 546.93  1.69  666.83 275.90 390.92  1.21 
        - Petroleum  274.90  208.58 66.32  0.36  250.90 232.40  18.50  0.10 
        - Plastics  1493.00  343.36  1149.64 1.32 1374.67  460.80 913.86  1.05 
        - Printing  1600.11  572.49  1027.62 1.19 1481.15  690.55 790.60  0.92 
        - Textiles  4867.34  2509.30  2358.04 1.08 4930.39  2446.73 2483.66  1.14 
        - Tobacco  88.67  135.93  -47.27 -0.45 71.58  152.89 -81.30  -0.78 
        - Transportation Equipment  2565.52  758.44  1807.08 1.42 2446.17 876.88 1569.29  1.23 
        - Wood Products  1046.77  1006.47 40.30  0.14  1026.80 1026.29  0.51  0.00 
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Population  483047.89 268150.77 214897.12 1.43 473604.28  277523.38 196080.90  1.30 
Transportation Cost  1143.61  1767.16 -623.55  -4.99  974.49 1935.01 -960.53  -8.25 
Human Development Index  0.70  0.64 0.06 5.68 0.71 0.63 0.09 8.57 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.82 3.95 0.87 5.35 4.95 3.82 1.13 7.27 
% Garbage Collection  76.66  65.65 11.01  4.29  79.06 63.28 15.78  6.39 
% Electric Lighting  90.25  80.83 9.42  4.76 92.09  79.00 13.09  6.90 
% Piped Water  79.31  62.22  17.09 5.83 82.43  59.14 23.29  8.43 
Theil Index  0.53  0.56  -0.03  -2.40 0.53 0.56 -0.03 -2.56 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  652.50  470.73  181.77  1.13  661.64 461.65 199.99  1.24 
    Agriculture  14898.50  13615.14  1283.36 0.45  14212.53  14295.95 -83.42  -0.03 
    Commerce  29574.33  15966.70  13607.63 1.49 28876.39  16659.39 12217.00  1.33 
    Construction  14584.53  8105.38  6479.15 1.47  14538.91  8150.66 6388.25  1.45 
    Finance  3737.89  1353.39  2384.51 1.53 3706.11  1384.93 2321.18  1.49 
    Fishing  381.59  421.68  -40.09  -0.34 337.11  465.82  -128.71 -1.08 
    Manufacturing  20171.79  8309.01  11862.78 1.74 19602.23  8874.29 10727.94  1.57 
        - Chemicals  2346.03  530.49  1815.54 1.65 2236.57 639.13 1597.44  1.45 
        - Electrical Equipment  1809.98  258.80  1551.17 1.84 1515.08 551.48  963.60  1.14 
        - Food  4905.85  2185.72  2720.13 2.00 4924.77  2166.94 2757.84  2.03 
        - Furniture  1984.97  905.24  1079.73 1.67 2004.71 885.65 1119.06  1.73 
        - Leather  323.61  86.38 237.23  1.54  320.58 89.38 231.19  1.50 
        - Machinery  1479.98  317.42  1162.56 2.08 1406.05 390.80 1015.24  1.81 
        - Metal  6300.22  1866.94  4433.28 1.73 6241.39  1925.32 4316.08  1.69 
        - Paper  754.97  188.42 566.55  1.75  706.72 236.31 470.41  1.45 
        - Petroleum  314.73  169.05 145.69  0.78  309.07 174.67 134.40  0.72 
        - Plastics  1603.98  233.21  1370.77 1.58 1511.15  325.35 1185.81  1.36 
        - Printing  1731.77  441.82  1289.95 1.50 1704.21  469.17 1235.05  1.43 
        - Textiles  5586.50  1795.55  3790.95 1.74 5263.34  2116.28 3147.06  1.44 
        - Tobacco  190.86  34.50 156.36  1.51  171.97 53.26 118.71  1.14 
        - Transportation Equipment  2517.83  805.77  1712.06 1.35 2760.38 565.04 2195.34  1.73 
        - Wood Products  1126.27  927.57 198.70  0.67  1045.02 1008.22  36.80  0.12 
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Population  486735.45 264490.95 222244.50 1.48 467955.85  283129.35 184826.50  1.23 
Transportation Cost  1028.30  1881.60 -853.30  -7.13  1133.79 1776.91 -643.12  -5.17 
Human Development Index  0.71  0.63 0.08 8.12 0.70 0.64 0.07 6.34 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.93 3.85 1.08 6.90 4.82 3.95 0.87 5.40 
% Garbage Collection  77.68  64.64 13.04  5.15  76.87 65.45 11.41  4.46 
% Electric Lighting  91.38  79.71 11.67  6.04  90.35 80.73 9.63  4.88 
% Piped Water  81.53  60.02  21.51 7.63 79.67  61.87 17.79  6.10 
Theil Index  0.53  0.56  -0.03  -2.64 0.53 0.56 -0.03 -2.66 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  697.28  426.28  271.00  1.69  654.02 469.22 184.81  1.15 
    Agriculture  13842.46  14663.24  -820.79 -0.29  13776.38  14728.82 -952.45  -0.33 
    Commerce  29789.32  15753.32  14036.00 1.53 28316.90  17214.67 11102.23  1.21 
    Construction  15032.99  7660.29  7372.71 1.67  14285.13  8402.52 5882.61  1.33 
    Finance  3808.41  1283.40  2525.01 1.62 3643.64  1446.94 2196.70  1.41 
    Fishing  326.52  476.33  -149.82 -1.26 345.36  457.63  -112.27 -0.94 
    Manufacturing  20816.44  7669.21  13147.22 1.93 18956.71  9514.96 9441.76  1.38 
        - Chemicals  2372.02  504.70  1867.31 1.70 2307.25 568.98 1738.27  1.58 
        - Electrical Equipment  1609.24  458.03  1151.21 1.36 1552.19 514.65 1037.54  1.23 
        - Food  4868.47  2222.82  2645.65 1.95 4593.53  2495.69 2097.84  1.54 
        - Furniture  2069.77  821.08  1248.68 1.94 1951.68 938.28 1013.40  1.57 
        - Leather  339.36  70.74  268.61 1.74 202.58  206.49 -3.91  -0.03 
        - Machinery  1524.29  273.45  1250.84 2.24 1413.53 383.38 1030.15  1.84 
        - Metal  6713.88  1456.39  5257.49 2.06 6190.96  1975.37 4215.59  1.65 
        - Paper  777.34  166.22 611.12  1.89  744.63 198.68 545.94  1.69 
        - Petroleum  323.36  160.48 162.88  0.88  288.85 194.74  94.11  0.51 
        - Plastics  1607.74  229.48  1378.26 1.59 1503.17  333.26 1169.91  1.34 
        - Printing  1751.05  422.68  1328.36 1.54 1670.70  502.42 1168.28  1.36 
        - Textiles  5899.49  1484.91  4414.58 2.03 5501.81  1879.60 3622.21  1.66 
        - Tobacco  184.08  41.23 142.85  1.38  82.43 142.12 -59.69  -0.57 
        - Transportation Equipment  2895.75  430.68  2465.07 1.94 2694.83 630.10 2064.73  1.63 
        - Wood Products  1064.50  988.88 75.62  0.25 1042.19 1011.02  31.17  0.10   43






















Population  495846.95 255447.95 240398.99 1.60 433239.95  317584.23 115655.72  0.77 
Transportation Cost  995.48  1914.18  -918.69 -7.80 1179.14  1731.90 -552.75  -4.38 
Human Development Index  0.71  0.63 0.08 7.76 0.70 0.64 0.06 5.49 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.93 3.84 1.10 7.00 4.78 3.99 0.78 4.79 
% Garbage Collection  78.53  63.80 14.73  5.90  75.94 66.37 9.57  3.70 
% Electric Lighting  91.75  79.34 12.41  6.48  89.76 81.32 8.44  4.23 
% Piped Water  82.22  59.34  22.88 8.24 78.40  63.14 15.26  5.14 
Theil Index  0.53  0.56  -0.03  -2.74 0.54 0.56 -0.01 -1.29 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  680.69  442.74  237.95 1.48 606.79  516.09  90.70  0.56 
    Agriculture  12906.25  15592.41  -2686.15 -0.93 12567.59  15928.53 -3360.94  -1.17 
    Commerce  30748.74  14801.12  15947.62 1.74 26185.04  19330.50 6854.54  0.75 
    Construction  15649.48  7048.43  8601.05 1.96  12946.73  9730.86 3215.87  0.73 
    Finance  3971.66  1121.38  2850.29 1.83 3269.41  1818.35 1451.05  0.93 
    Fishing  327.31  475.55  -148.24 -1.25 355.21  447.85 -92.64  -0.78 
    Manufacturing  21249.27  7239.64  14009.63 2.06 17026.47  11430.69 5595.78  0.82 
        - Chemicals  2454.58  422.76  2031.83 1.85 2150.39 724.66 1425.74  1.29 
        - Electrical Equipment  1668.53  399.19  1269.34 1.50 1672.45 395.30 1277.15  1.51 
        - Food  4938.75  2153.06  2785.69 2.05 4142.00  2943.82 1198.18  0.88 
        - Furniture  2135.24  756.10  1379.14 2.14 1751.83 1136.63  615.19  0.95 
        - Leather  331.16  78.88  252.28 1.64 174.01  234.85 -60.84  -0.39 
        - Machinery  1582.57  215.61  1366.96 2.45 1293.08 502.92  790.17  1.41 
        - Metal  6982.93  1189.36  5793.58 2.28 5566.11  2595.52 2970.59  1.16 
        - Paper  802.66  141.09 661.57  2.05  726.78 216.40 510.38  1.58 
        - Petroleum  339.57  144.40 195.17  1.05  255.36 227.98  27.38  0.15 
        - Plastics  1615.04  222.24  1392.80 1.60 1379.28  456.23 923.05  1.06 
        - Printing  1810.45  363.73  1446.72 1.68 1519.68  652.31 867.37  1.00 
        - Textiles  6042.16  1343.31  4698.84 2.17 4859.61  2516.98 2342.63  1.07 
        - Tobacco  194.84  30.56 164.28  1.59  69.76 154.70 -84.94  -0.82 
        - Transportation Equipment  2946.64  380.17  2566.47 2.03 2481.16 842.16 1639.00  1.29 
        - Wood Products  1071.26  982.17 89.09  0.30 1012.93  1040.06 -27.13  -0.09 
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Population  494480.52 256804.11 237676.40 1.58 405143.48  345469.44 59674.03  0.40 
Transportation Cost  1339.22  1573.02 -233.80  -1.80  1331.17 1581.02 -249.85  -1.93 
Human Development Index  0.69  0.65 0.05 4.31 0.69 0.65 0.05 4.14 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.72 4.06 0.66 3.98 4.70 4.08 0.62 3.74 
% Garbage Collection  73.41  68.88 4.53  1.71 72.53  69.75 2.78  1.05 
% Electric Lighting  88.14  82.92 5.22  2.56 88.28  82.79 5.49  2.70 
% Piped Water  74.99  66.52  8.47 2.76  75.54  65.98 9.56  3.13 
Theil  Index  0.55 0.55 0.00 -0.39 0.55 0.55 0.00 -0.15 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  694.68  428.86  265.81  1.66  652.35 470.87 181.49  1.13 
    Agriculture  16372.89  12151.83  4221.06 1.47  15174.62  13341.09 1833.53  0.64 
    Commerce  30046.86  15497.72  14549.14 1.59 24272.36  21228.80 3043.56  0.33 
    Construction  14653.68  8036.75  6616.92 1.50  12034.50  10636.23 1398.28  0.32 
    Finance  3656.77  1433.90  2222.87 1.43 2687.67  2395.71 291.96  0.19 
    Fishing  491.92  312.17  179.75 1.51 406.32  397.13 9.19  0.08 
    Manufacturing  19516.73  8959.15  10557.58 1.54 16028.34  12421.31 3607.03  0.53 
        - Chemicals  2247.27  628.51  1618.77 1.47 1680.43 1191.09  489.34  0.44 
        - Electrical Equipment  1726.04  342.11  1383.93 1.64 1417.47 648.36  769.11  0.91 
        - Food  4845.52  2245.59  2599.93 1.91 3748.35  3334.51 413.84  0.30 
        - Furniture  1934.37  955.46 978.91  1.51  1651.33 1236.38  414.95  0.64 
        - Leather  305.27  104.57  200.70 1.30 142.03  266.59 -124.56  -0.80 
        - Machinery  1417.30  379.63  1037.67 1.85 1052.18 742.01  310.17  0.55 
        - Metal  6015.12  2149.89  3865.23 1.51 4877.16  3279.29 1597.87  0.62 
        - Paper  750.68  192.68 558.01  1.73  564.99 376.97 188.02  0.58 
        - Petroleum  297.14  186.50 110.64  0.60  134.36 348.06 -213.70  -1.15 
        - Plastics  1509.14  327.35  1181.79 1.36 1180.78  653.23 527.55  0.60 
        - Printing  1686.61  486.63  1199.98 1.39 1283.51  886.71 396.80  0.46 
        - Textiles  4980.33  2397.16  2583.18 1.18 4399.32  2973.80 1425.53  0.65 
        - Tobacco  170.25  54.96  115.29 1.11  53.64  170.70 -117.06  -1.13 
        - Transportation Equipment  2444.80  878.24  1566.56 1.23 2043.08 1276.94  766.14  0.60 
        - Wood Products  1244.79  809.94 434.84  1.47  1189.04 865.28  323.76  1.09   45






















Population  509778.11 241621.53 268156.58 1.79 516224.73  235223.39 281001.34  1.87 
Transportation Cost  1122.93  1787.69 -664.76  -5.36  1170.15 1740.83 -570.68  -4.54 
Human Development Index  0.71  0.63 0.08 7.71 0.70 0.63 0.07 6.57 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.91 3.86 1.05 6.68 4.85 3.93 0.92 5.72 
% Garbage Collection  76.85  65.47 11.38  4.45  75.95 66.36 9.58  3.70 
% Electric Lighting  90.69  80.39 10.30  5.25  90.13 80.95 9.18  4.63 
% Piped Water  80.35  61.19  19.16 6.65 79.20  62.34 16.85  5.74 
Theil Index  0.54  0.56  -0.02  -1.81 0.54 0.55 -0.01 -0.96 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  768.50  355.59  412.91  2.59  766.34 357.74 408.60  2.56 
    Agriculture  14944.23  13569.76  1374.47 0.48  15729.87  12790.02 2939.85  1.02 
    Commerce  31148.07  14404.79  16743.29 1.83 31453.90  14101.26 17352.64  1.90 
    Construction  15586.88  7110.56  8476.32 1.93  15705.95  6992.39 8713.56  1.98 
    Finance  3872.97  1219.33  2653.64 1.71 3882.99  1209.38 2673.61  1.72 
    Fishing  447.04  356.71  90.33 0.76  447.56  356.21 91.35  0.77 
    Manufacturing  21031.03  7456.24  13574.79 1.99 21017.92  7469.25 13548.67  1.99 
        - Chemicals  2316.70  559.61  1757.09 1.59 2339.70 536.78 1802.92  1.64 
        - Electrical Equipment  1824.77  244.13  1580.64 1.88 1824.14 244.75 1579.38  1.88 
        - Food  5149.95  1943.45  3206.51 2.37 5075.14  2017.70 3057.43  2.25 
        - Furniture  2136.22  755.13  1381.09 2.15 2098.05 793.01 1305.04  2.03 
        - Leather  319.26  90.69 228.57  1.48  315.89 94.04 221.85  1.44 
        - Machinery  1512.36  285.29  1227.08 2.20 1508.46 289.16 1219.30  2.18 
        - Metal  6787.52  1383.30  5404.21 2.12 6753.26  1417.30 5335.95  2.09 
        - Paper  792.21  151.46 640.75  1.98  799.22 144.50 654.72  2.03 
        - Petroleum  322.19  161.65 160.54  0.87  322.65 161.19 161.46  0.87 
        - Plastics  1603.60  233.59  1370.00 1.58 1600.83  236.34 1364.49  1.57 
        - Printing  1774.79  399.12  1375.67 1.60 1782.72  391.25 1391.47  1.62 
        - Textiles  5740.84  1642.37  4098.47 1.89 5775.75  1607.72 4168.03  1.92 
        - Tobacco  174.45  50.79 123.67  1.19  173.58 51.66 121.91  1.17 
        - Transportation Equipment  2743.73  581.56  2162.18 1.70 2704.30 620.69 2083.61  1.64 
        - Wood Products  1288.22  766.84 521.38  1.76  1289.27 765.79  523.48  1.77 
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Population  469430.10 281666.18 187763.92 1.25 495177.84  256112.03 239065.81  1.59 
Transportation Cost  1287.46  1624.40 -336.93  -2.61  1335.77 1576.45 -240.68  -1.85 
Human Development Index  0.69  0.65 0.04 3.59 0.69 0.64 0.05 4.54 
Average Education ( > 25 Years)  4.65 4.12 0.53 3.16 4.72 4.05 0.67 4.08 
% Garbage Collection  73.51  68.78 4.73  1.79 74.18  68.12 6.06  2.31 
% Electric Lighting  87.80  83.26 4.55  2.22 88.09  82.97 5.13  2.52 
% Piped Water  75.42  66.09  9.34 3.05  75.84  65.67 10.18  3.33 
Theil  Index  0.55 0.55 0.00 -0.25 0.55 0.55 0.00 0.14 
E m p l o y m e n t :           
    Mining  666.62  456.71  209.90  1.30  681.59 441.85 239.74  1.49 
    Agriculture  14115.25  14392.50  -277.26 -0.10  17067.28  11462.67 5604.61  1.96 
    Commerce  28073.17  17456.57  10616.60 1.16 30079.71  15465.11 14614.60  1.60 
    Construction  14109.64  8576.70  5532.95 1.25  14629.86  8060.39 6569.47  1.49 
    Finance  3469.74  1619.53  1850.21 1.19 3732.35  1358.89 2373.46  1.52 
    Fishing  385.08  418.21  -33.14  -0.28  464.44 339.45 124.99  1.05 
    Manufacturing  18558.80  9909.88  8648.92 1.26  19126.81  9346.14 9780.67  1.43 
        - Chemicals  2289.85  586.25  1703.60 1.55 2088.69 785.90 1302.79  1.18 
        - Electrical Equipment  1759.01  309.39  1449.62 1.72 1646.49 421.06 1225.43  1.45 
        - Food  4309.66  2777.42  1532.23 1.12 4647.19  2442.43 2204.76  1.62 
        - Furniture  1788.87  1099.87 689.01  1.06  1989.21 901.03 1088.18  1.69 
        - Leather  181.51  227.41 -45.90  -0.30  314.77 95.14 219.63  1.42 
        - Machinery  1363.04  433.49 929.55  1.66  1311.92 484.23  827.69  1.47 
        - Metal  6244.34  1922.39  4321.95 1.69 5555.41  2606.15 2949.26  1.15 
        - Paper  738.81  204.46 534.35  1.65  672.73 270.05 402.68  1.24 
        - Petroleum  278.39  205.12 73.27  0.39  282.74 200.80  81.95  0.44 
        - Plastics  1460.04  376.08  1083.96 1.24 1442.48  393.50 1048.99  1.20 
        - Printing  1616.00  556.71  1059.29 1.23 1693.58  479.71 1213.87  1.41 
        - Textiles  5463.92  1917.20  3546.72 1.63 4902.08  2474.83 2427.25  1.11 
        - Tobacco  71.71  152.76 -81.05  -0.78  174.46 50.78 123.68  1.19 
        - Transportation Equipment  2708.68  616.35  2092.34 1.65 2357.99 964.40 1393.59  1.09 
        - Wood Products  1171.95  882.24 289.71  0.98  1352.39 703.15  649.25  2.20 
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Figure 1:  Brazilian Monthly Per Capita Income Distribution 
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